

Social Impact Bonds

2022

- 1 Background
- 2 Applicability
- 3 Sales


• Background - Success Factors

SIB should be Simple	Confine the project to a specific primary outcome within a narrowed scope to ensure the arrangement is manageable
Dedicated Service manager	Dedicated person responsible for day-to-day operations and reporting to project stakeholders
Close collaboration between parties	Between the service provider, investor and contracting body
Early Market Consultation	Both with investors and providers (due to the high level of uncertainty around SIBs)

McKinsey (2012): most promising areas for SIBs are criminal justice and prevention of homelessness

• Background – SIBs have been used in multiple countries and for multiple social areas...

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


U.K.

15

...and for multiple social areas

Figure 5: Active SIBs by Sector




Background - ... With a wide variety of contract durations...

140 120 100 Months* 80 60 50 20 U.K. U.K. U.K. U.K. U.S. Netherlands Australia
U.S.
U.S.
Canada
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.


Figure 9. SIB Contract Duration

• Background - ...upfront capital commitments...


Figure 7. Upfront Capital Commitment in SIBs



• Background - ...number of target beneficiaries...



• Background ... and amount of roles involved



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• Applicability – SIBs has many potential benefits...

Potential Benefit

Description

Focus on outcomes instead of outputs	Given focus on delivery of measurable results	
Savings for taxpayers	Given focus on delivery of measurable results	
Access to new and substantial revenue streams	Given financing by private instead of public funding	
Shift financial risk to private sector	As currenty the risk of unsuccessful investment in social programs is borne by the government	
Enhanced impact measurement to be used for other social projects	SIBs require significant investments in data quality and impact measurement practices, potentially to be used by other social projects	
New financial product for socially conscious investor	Socially conscious investors will have more options to invest responsibly	

SIBs often result in new investment in social policies, that the government otherwise likely would not have spent

• Applicability – ... however, also several potential disadvantages...

Potential Disadvantage

Description

Limited number of suitable projects	Limited number of projects that are sufficiently quantifiable and for which there is sufficient evidence / belief that intervention yields results	
High transaction costs	Given required extensive negotiations, complex impact measurement and pricing of product (setting up SIB typically takes up to 1-2 years)	
Government to pay high risk premium	As investors need to have a reasonable return expectation on their investment, requiring the government to make the conditions attractive	
Only 'safe' projects will be chosen / investor bears limited risk	Only projects will be selected that likely succeed given reputational risk for SIBs if the project does not pay off	
SIB has inferior characteristics than traditional bonds	SIBs have equity-like risk profile and do not pay back coupons (only pay at end of term in case of success)	
Projects face more continuity risk	Cause funding will likely dry up if performance targets are not met, as opposed to traditional government-funded projects that likely continue	
Social services to become more expensive	As investment likel creates pressure to start charging for social services	

Due to above disadvantages SIBs might not be as popular as expected (in fact, many SIBs in the past have not hit maturity in the past)

• Deep-dive: Limited number of available projects, as projects need to suffice large number of conditions

Conditions

Description

Measurable outcomes for defined cohort of service users	Impact of intervention can be tracked and quantified	
Limited contractual period	Investors need to have potential to have money returned in foreseeable time period	
Clear correlation between intervention and result	Not too many factors should have influence on outcome, Randomness of outcome should be avoided	
Value of payment is sufficient reward for risk by investor	Should be significant given equity-like risk profile of SIB	
Value of outcome is larger than the costs involved	Otherwise social project is more suitable for generic government subsidy	
Gaming of system is not possible	Success or failure should be objective and not be subject to service manager's influence	

Sales - ... And these challenges are confirmed by the different actors

Financial mechanisms in place Existing capacity to scale up social service Availability of monetizable outcomes Coordination among actors involved in the SIB/DIB Availability of evidence that service provider could produce desired outcomes Availability of measurable outcomes Financial costs of the deal Favorable legal conditions in place Private investor convinced of significant return Wait time to see measurable results Availability of technical advice Election cycles Presence of philanthropic actor willing to bear risk Willingness of payors to repay investors Willingness of government to support the social service itself Willingness of government to support SIB transaction 10% 20% 100% Percentage of Actors' Responses ■ A Big Challenge
Somewhat of a Challenge
Not a challenge

Figure 13. Challenges in Developing SIBs

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• Sales – Bondholder target

Both SIB underwriters and investors are private parties Structure the SIBs financially and syndicate out to investors Mostly by investment banks so far E.g. Goldman Sachs, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, and Northern Trust Any non-governmental body, but until now mostly high net worth individuals or foundations

Metaphor

- SIBs are often sold using lightbulb as metaphor
 - All old-fashioned lightbulbs are replaced by LEDs for free by investor
 - If energy savings are sufficient, investors gets significant return
 - If not, the investor would take the lightbulbs back and return the old lighbulbs

Underwriters and investor are involved in SIBs for both financial and social reasons

• Sales - Different actors are involved in SIBs for different reasons

Figure 12. SIB Actor Primary Motivations Opportunity to demonstrate (test) innovative financial model to address social problems Opportunity to improve collaboration among public, private, and development funders Opportunity to scale up intervention that works Opportunity to test innovative social intervention Equal combination of social and financial returns Social return/Outcome achievement Financial return/Savings 20% 25% 15% 35% 40% **Percentage of Actor Responses** Outcome funders
 Intermediaries
 Service providers
 Senior investors

• Sales – Pricing

SIBs can be _I	oriced in different ways	Bu	it pricing generally depends on
Cost-plus	 Cost of intervention¹ + % pre-determined max RoR Requires minimal info 	(Perceived) risk	 Involves default, event and inflation risk No interest, reinvestment or market risk Typically large given equity-like risk profile
Market price	 Basis supply and demand for SIB Given procurement 	Size of upfront investment	Required investment to achieve prognosed impact
Cashable benefits	Based on prediction of free- cash-flow generated	Resources involved	E.g. employee salaries, invested capital, transaction and monitoring costs, etc
Quantified social value	Especially suitable for projects that do not have significanrt cashable benefits	(Expected) time to maturity	 As investors hold SIBs for their duration There is no secondary market (yet)

Optimal pricing is a mix of above methods and factors